Jonathan Powell was chief of staff to Tony Blair throughout his ten-year premiership, and was instrumental in the negotiations that led to the Good Friday agreement in 1998. As Powell writes in the new issue of Prospect, the recent tenth anniversary of the agreement has given rise to a good deal of criticism, largely from right-wing commentators, that the British government allowed the extremists in Northern Ireland to emerge politically victorious, leaving the moderate parties on both the unionist and the republican sides to wither.
Powell responds to this critique in his Prospect piece, providing insight into the manoeuvrings and machinations that lay behind the political developments in the province. He argues that despite the unique nature of the Northern Ireland conflict, there are useful lessons to be drawn for other trouble spots in the world—and repeats his controversial point, first made on the Andrew Marr show a few weeks ago, that it is essential to have a channel in place for negotiation with the likes of the Taliban and al Qaeda.
Perhaps a key point in this analysis is the definition of ‘extremist’. What Sinn Fein and the DUP represent are nationalism and unionism in the ‘raw’, they are, if you will, the essence of the two positions. What separates the SDLP from SF, for example, is something entirely different from what separates it from the UUP. In the first case it is a matter of degree; in the second case it is a matter of nature.
This does not mean that the difference between the SDLP and SF, on the one hand, is similar to the difference between a social democrat and a communist, while, on the other hand, the difference between the SDLP and UUP is similar to the difference between a social democrat and a conservative. It is nothing so simple.
If the differences were merely of this nature there would be no problem. The problem arises from the fact that we are dealing with two distinct nationalities (which is why the border is an issue). Jonathan ducks this issue by referring to two ‘traditions’. The term ‘tradition’ is used, in NI at least, for deliberately obscurantist reasons: nationalists use it to imply that the unionist community is simply a dissenting minority tradition within an essentially single Irish nation. Political unionism can thus be implicitly dismissed as either a form of ‘false consciousness’ or the creation of external (British) machinations. It means unionism does not have to be recognised as a distinct thing in itself. Unionists play the same game for similar reasons - to dismiss nationalism as either the result of external (southern) machinations or as simply a dissenting minority within the NI body politics which, as a minority ‘political’ position can be ignored or at least denied recognition as a distinct community.
The real problem is the existence of two distinct communities, with different national allegiances, within the same borders. Attempting traditional democracy in an area where the two communities do not agree on the fundamental first order issue of the existence, nature and extent of the state, is pre-doomed to failure and war. The Agreement tacitly admits this by creating a devolved Assembly where everybody is in government and, consequently, there is no opposition. It even goes as far as granting people in NI the right to be recognised as British or Irish. However its fatal flaw is that it clings to an outdated notion of sovereignty which is entirely Hobbesian and ‘indivisible’. Firstly it opts for a form of internal, devolved power-sharing in which political parties are, divisively, required to ‘designate’ themselves as nationalist or unionist, rather than introduce joint British-Irish sovereignty which would have been more stable and would have allowed for a form of power-sharing without designation. Secondly the Agreement makes the either/or constitutional position of NI dependent on a simple majoritarian referendum. Perhaps if there emerges a nationalist majority in the future unionists will simply accept it and resign themselves to a united Ireland - but perhaps they won’t and will instead, just as in 1912, opt for a redrawing of the border to create a rump NI in which they would have a workable majority. This would be a recipe for re-partition and ethnic cleansing. The alternative to this is, again, a for of sovereignty that is ‘and’, not ‘either/or’ - back to joint sovereignty.
The Agreement, like most British initiatives in Ireland, is designed not to deal with the fundamental structural problems that are the source of the conflict, but to manage the current situation sufficiently to secure a respite from the problems of NI - at least for the time being. The problem is managed, not solved.
The idea that ‘normal’ left/right politics will emerge in NI before the fundamental constitutional issues are resolved is laughable. Jonathan quotes David Trimble’s predictions of the emergence of ‘normal’ politics in NI apparently without realising that this is not an objective assessment but is a subjective liberal unionist fantasy - if ‘normal’ politics existed then the problem of nationalism would vanish. Historically this has taken the form of agitating for the British Labour Party to contest elections in NI, the assumption being that it would eat into the nationalist vote and solve the problem. It is, and always has been, a fantasy.
But I’ve made these points before in Official Irish Republicanism (now available for download, by the way, at http://stores.lulu.com/store.php?fAcctID=718841 )
Before the lessons of NI can be transposed on to bin Ladin et al, the following questions should be addressed:
1) What is al Qaeda the ‘extreme’ form of?
2) Despite the propaganda of their detractors (and usually they were each other’s main detractors) SF and the DUP existed within the broad western tradition, their aims were secular and fundamentally national/political, not universal - to what extent can this be said of AQ?
Sean, first of all, this may be very unprofessional on a Prospect blog, but how are things with you?
Having just read Powell’s article, I have to say I am very impressed. My inclination - like most NI watchers - was to be critical, but I could find few flaws, and I think his analysis is pretty honest, and hits right in the bulls-eye.
It is not perfect, of course. Unfortunately he contradicts himself when he says a terrorist incident can derail the process but exempts Omagh from this category.
I think you are right to lampoon his mention of Trimble’s ‘normal politics’, but this was expressed more as a hope than reality. On the other hand, you know as well as I that no Unionist would ever accept Joint Authority.
Moving beyond Ulster, I think Powell is right about the need to engage militants in peace processes and engage in ‘constructive ambiguity’ or Paul Dixon’s ‘theatrical politics’ to allow the two sides to sell a deal to their backwoodsmen.
Where I think Powell needs to qualify his argument is with respect to the uniqueness of NI. There is no analogue of the neutral British (who can enforce, or at least incentivise, a deal by putting pressure on Unionism) in Sri Lanka or Israel/Palestine.
And of course no one could have predicted that Dr. No would perform such a volte-face! I admit as much in my book The Orange Order (OK, let’s both shamelessly plug our reads). That a man who led a mob to protest a small tricolour in a Sinn Fein office in a Nationalist area would turn around and hug an ex-terrorist and share power with him simply beggars belief. This happened because of the unqiue biography of Ian Paisley, Unionist outsider and ambitious malcontent, whose ego and desire for power trumped his beliefs. The majority of Unionism wanted to say ‘no’ because they were viscerally opposed to the idea of ‘guns in government’. And 9 of 10 (99 of 100?) hardline leaders would have delivered that ‘no’. There were many politicians all too ready to pick up the populist banner (i.e. Willie Ross and many in the anti-Agreement wing of the UUP).
Paisley’s about-turn flummoxed most Unionists on the ground: if the Big Man could ’sell out’, then, well, maybe a deal was inevitable after all.
I wouldn’t count on al-Sadr, the Hamas leadership, Netanyahu or the LTTE and hardline Sinhala leaders having similar epiphanies to Paisley. We must engage radicals, but we should recognize the lucky cards which we had to play in NI. Blair did keep the process going, and the GFA was a vindication of both ‘constructive ambiguity’ and engaging radicals. But let’s face it, the GFA largely succeeded because of internal NI dynamics and dumb luck.
Hi Erich, “you know as well as I that no Unionist would ever accept Joint Authority” - but they would accept a united Ireland on the basis of a 50%+1 referendum?
I think you miss the point. Formal recognition of the two nationalities (that is, recognition of reality) requires joint sovereignty. The traditional unionist objection to Joint Sovereignty has, to a large though not total degree, been based on the assumption that it is a stepping-stone to a united Ireland, rather that a constitutional end point. Joint Sovereignty means the end of a ‘Simply British’ NI, but it also means the maintenance of the Union, it means no ‘Brits Out’, but it also means the creation of a united Ireland. Peter Hain was advocating joint sovereignty in Gibraltar, where there is total oppositio to it, but never advocated it in relation to NI. A bad example of the contingency and randomness of British policy in relation to such matters.
I’m not too sure I agree with the whole notion that Paisley is a power hungry traitor to his conscience. It strikes me as a slighty smug and elitist reading of the man.
“But let’s face it, the GFA largely succeeded because of internal NI dynamics and dumb luck”. I’m afraid I can’t agree that history has ended in NI and it is way to early to declare the GFA a success. The referendum clause in the Agreement may yet open the gates to a new conflict - this is the danger I’m trying to highlight here. The term ‘constructive ambiguity’ is indicative of an attitude that attempts to manage, rather than address, the root problems. The Anglo-Irish Treaty was ambiguous, and that laid the ground for civil war in the short term and a disfunctional NI in the long-term (the Boundary Commission should never have been ambiguous and then allowed to fail).
As to the middle-east, unfortunately I don’t speak Arabic, nor do I have any proper understanding of Islam as it actually exists in actual individual Arab societies (being mediated through local custom and tradition). Having no native knowledge of either the language, culture or politics (academic knowledge of such things is often, in my experience, worse than useless - it creates an illusion of knowledge that is often worse than honest ignorance) I can only ask questions on the subject - I have no gut understanding. It would, however seem that the US can act as a major influence in the Israeli-Arab conflict, as Carter and Clinton did in the past (Camp David, Oslo) - and isn’t there some US involvement in Iraq? No Nobel peace prizes there though…
Sean,
Good points, but I have to pick up my son from a friend’s place, so let me quickly start quibbling. First, Unionists accept a 50+1 United Ireland in principle, but if demographics brought that into reality (in line with Gerry et al’s hopes), they would back off pretty quickly or light off a few bombs in Dublin if coerced. Of course this won’t happen any time soon because too many northern Catholics are opposed to a united Ireland. That said, I haven’t heard as much positive noise about the Republic from Unionists as I have since SF’s embarassment in the elections there and the southern funding of Orange projects. But the Republic is certainly unwilling to shoulder the burden of an economy whose GDP remains 80% government sponsored.
While I think you may be right about the GFA if demography and public opinion change, it will be 2060-80 before NI’s voting-age electorate (not the overall population where Catholics are a somewhat higher share) becomes 50-50. And perhaps another few centuries before all northern Catholics and the Republic’s government are on board. So I don’t see the danger to the GFA that you do.
Yes, constructive ambiguity masks the issues, but I can’t see how else the extremists’ guns could have been silenced since their aims are irreconcilable. Joint sovereignty would be the ideal, but the Unionists would never have signed up to it and the Republic just can’t afford it.
As for the US, they aren’t as neutral toward Israel (’no selfish or strategic interest’?) as the Brits in NI. Surely this is even more evident in Iraq………
Yours.
Eric
Eric, eric, Eric (3 times in apology for misspelling your name above)
‘too many northern Catholics are opposed to a united Ireland’ - what do you base this on? It can’t be actual election results so I assume it can only be some sort of opinion poll (when and where?). But the trouble with opinion polls in NI - as you well know - is that people have a habit of being a bit coy when accosted in the street by a stranger carrying a clipboard and asking them about their political beliefs (I can’t think why…). This why opinion polls, for example, always underestimate the degree of support for SF and the DUP - only to look v foolish when the actual vote, the only opinion poll that counts, is counted.
‘the Republic is certainly unwilling to shoulder the burden of an economy whose GDP remains 80% government sponsored’. They already do, albeit to a limited degree - but remember I’m talking about a shared ‘joint’ burden. In any case, what makes you think that NI can’t be an economic success? Paisley certainly thinks it can (see his speech yesterday)
‘As for the US, they aren’t as neutral toward Israel (’no selfish or strategic interest’?) as the Brits in NI’
Yes, and people wonder why the Unionists have a seige mentality…but indifference is infinitely worse than positive government.
Don’t misunderstand me, my favoured option is a 32 county secular socialist republic, not joint sovereignty, but that in the same category as my saying that my ideal news source would not be Paxo on the telly but Sophie Raworth at the end of my bed (wearing stockings and suspenders) - we must stay within the realms of the attainable.
Re the SF vote and the south, the Provos are a product of NI, they arose from social conditions existing there which were totally absent from the south - people who miss that point never understand NI. (Interesting footnote to this, some anti-SF would-be Machiavellians in the south imagined that FF organising in NI would hit the SF vote - but one of the first to join FF was a former UNIONIST councillor - oops!) BUT … given the way in which the Green Party sold out in exchange for a place in Cabinet, I wouldn’t be surprised if SF do well in the next Dail election - for left-wing reasons, not nationalist ones. It’s a bit like the SNP in Scotland - left wing nationalism is becoming the new socialism now that NuLab have turned Yankee Poodle.
In reality there will probably be neither a UK nor a united Ireland in any recognisable sense in 40 years time, just a collection of interdependent small states as part of the EU - and that would be no tragedy.
As to the US not being impartial in the Arab/Israeli conflict - that was sort of my point … it was only when something like impartiality in the US (Carter, Clinton) existed that there was progress (peace with Egypt and Jordan).
May the Raven God, All-Father Odin, watch over you (that beats Dave Allen)
An interesting dialogue by two academics on a topic that so many people in England and the Irish republic prefer to keep at longer than a bargepole distance. Reacting to thirty years of rancour and violence the general public in the republic has turned its back on Northern Ireland, and this is a big pity. It paralyses dynamic social interaction on the important “totality of relations” concept that emerged in diplomatic business overseen in the 1980s by people like Brian Lenihan (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and premier/taoiseach Garret FitzGerald. More could be done by governments and their respective quangos to foster dynamic interaction between NI and the Republic, the Republic and Scotland, England and Wales; and NI and Scotland, England and Wales. I am talking about business and cultural interactions, things more important than the surges of temporary tribal emotions generated at international soccer and rugby matches. [Sorry if I've neglected the channel islands and the Isle of Man.]
Sean has expressed a personal piety that echoes what liberal and left-leaning commentators on the Northern Ireland conflict often wrote about, in exasperation, since the emergence of conflict in 1969:- ” my favoured option is a 32 county secular socialist republic, not joint sovereignty…” I think Sean and his fellow travellers can wait for that to happen until the cows come home. Underestimating the persistence of religion has been a serious flaw among liberals and leftwingers since the late 19th century. Certainly there has been a sweeping disenchantment with the Catholic Church in the republic in recent decades, but this hasn’t produced a huge “socialist” vote in elections. Secularism doesn’t equal socialism. Anyway center-right governments have taken on welfare state measures in western Europe as a pragmatic vote-catching strategy since the turmoil of the Second World War. Will protestant religious sentiment fade away in Northern Ireland and pave the way for a secular state? Maybe when the cows decide to come home.
Garreth,
I want to give you an award - I just can’t decide whether it should be for ’selective reading’ or ‘nit-picking’ - neither of which qualifies as a critique, by the way. I make several serious points and one less than serious - and that’s the one you seize on (and still only quote selectively from). It read in full
“Don’t misunderstand me, my favoured option is a 32 county secular socialist republic, not joint sovereignty, but that in the same category as my saying that my ideal news source would not be Paxo on the telly but Sophie Raworth at the end of my bed (wearing stockings and suspenders) - we must stay within the realms of the attainable”
You don’t read the Sindo, by any chance, do you?
No, I refuse to buy that publication. Your several serious points about NI are apt in my view; but who in England or the Irish republic wants to bother about “that place”?
Hi Garrreth,
Glad to hear you don’t read the Sindo - a sensible act of mental hygiene, in my opinion. I have v. little time, but a few quick points:
Yes, the refusal of either the South or GB to engage fully and honestly with NI - rather than seeing it as an EXTERNAL problem to be managed, has not been helpful.
the result has been for the 2 communities NI to come up with their own, separate coping mechanisms - including the DUP and SF.
Your point about relations between England, the South, Scotland, NI, etc is fair enough and that’s the direction in which things are heading.
Re religion - the point in NI is not religion, it’s two nationalities. As both speak English and are white, the easiest cultural identifier to tell them apart is religious differences - but that doesn’t make it a relgious conflict (religion has a role, but is not the main issue). In fact many Loyalists - and more republicans - are actually secular in my experience of them.